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ABSTRACT 
The U.S. invasion of Iraq and its continued presence has been costly in terms of 
lives, money and global reputation.  Britain suffered the same consequences in Iraq 
during its post-World War I mandate.  In both cases, the U.S. and Britain attempted Iraqi 
state building following the initial successes of their invasions but were met with 
significant political and social obstacles.  Critics of the U.S. invasion often state that the 
American administration should have heeded the lessons learned from British Mandate.  
This thesis will carefully examine the case studies of the British Mandate and the 
U.S. involvement in Iraq in order to show that the two experiences are not identical.  
Firstly, the ideological motivation and impetus for the invasions differ substantially.  The 
U.S. notion of stability and security through democracy is arguably more conducive to 
state building than the underlying imperialist motivations of the British.  Moreover, the 
progression of “World Time” has created a dissimilar operational environment between 
the two invasions and state building endeavors.  The U.S. state building venture will 
hopefully yield better results and create a more stable Iraq than what the British Mandate 
created. 
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The modern state of Iraq is characterized by cyclical periods of colonial rule, 
puppet monarchies, despotism and uninvited regime change.  Beginning with ancient 
Mesopotamian civilizations, Islamic empires and foreign occupations, history has shown 
that Iraq is “a very difficult country to govern.”1  The current American presence in Iraq 
is the latest variable in the political cycle of a state searching for an identity and self-
determined government.  The ongoing American presence in Iraq is a critical issue not 
only to the Iraqis themselves, but to Americans as well.  It is at the forefront of the 
candidates’ platforms in the 2008 Presidential elections.  A key issue for the American 
voter will be the choice between the candidate who supports an accelerated troop 
withdrawal versus the candidate who advocates prolonged commitment and gradual troop 
withdrawals.  Either way, the fact remains that with or without American assistance, Iraq 
must rebuild a politically fractured and socially decimated state.  Similar to the aftermath 
of the British Mandate, Iraq’s path to success and its efficiency in state-building will be a 
legacy that the American government will inherit regardless of presidential election 
results.2   
It is alarmingly evident that America’s global reputation is suffering.  A recent 
New York Times article documented U.S. global alienation resulting from its position as 
a sole super-power.3  The article cited global irritation with America’s “muscular 
morality” in its foreign policy.  The international community, especially the Arab world, 
has squarely placed blame for Iraq’s woes on the United States.  To make matters even 
gloomier, the American population has increasingly become disillusioned with the Iraq 
war and the predicament of their country.  Current economic troubles, continued threats 
of terrorism and the pro-longed Iraq/Afghanistan war have convinced almost 80% of 
                                                 
1 Tim Niblock, Iraq: The Contemporary State (New York: Saint Martin Press, 1982), 1. 
2 Toby Dodge, Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation Building and a History Denied (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2003), xix. 
3 Parag Khanna, “Waving Goodbye to Hegemony.” New York Times, January 27, 2008.   
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Americans that their country is in one way or another on the “wrong track.”4  Even in its 
attempts to rectify the situation, the U.S. finds itself constrained by distrust abroad and 
doubt and war weariness at home.  It is indisputable that despite the tenuous success of 
the 2007 “Troop Surge,” Iraq is still a country in turmoil and current American reputation 
abroad is that of a global culprit.  It is in the interest of the American people and the 
international community that the U.S. extricates itself from Iraq in a manner that leaves 
behind a better country than what the British left following the Mandate.     
Critics of the American invasion and continued presence in Iraq often attribute the 
country’s political and social instability to the American’s failure to learn from the 
mistakes made during the British Mandate.   In a February 2008 interview, British royal 
Prince Andrew stated that there were "occasions when people in the UK would wish that 
those in responsible positions in the US might listen and learn from our experiences."5 
This thesis argues that a comparison of the British and American ventures in Iraq 
is not an “apples-to-apples” assessment, but rather more attention should be paid to the 
contrasting aspects of the two experiences.  Although comparing the two invasions has 
some merits, in fact, the Iraq the U.S. invaded was significantly different from the Iraq 
that the British occupied during its 1920 Mandate.  Social and political scientists have 
posited that time affects the potential for state-building and its processes.6  However, 
exactly how different eras, institutional legacies, and global trajectories interact with the 
creation of a state and national identities has not been specified.  The overarching 
question I will research in this thesis is how the in-congruency of the conditions 
preceding the two invasions affected the processes of Iraqi state-building.  A historical 
comparison of the political and social conditions present prior to the onset of both 
occupations will query if and how the British state-building endeavor of the post-colonial 
era was a vastly different animal than the current U.S. state-building campaign in Iraq.  
As such, this thesis will contribute both to policy concerns regarding the search for a 
                                                 
4 Fareed Zakaria, “The Rise of the Rest,” Newsweek, May 12, 2008. 
5 BBC News, “Prince Andrew Rebukes US on Iraq,” February 5, 2008, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7227627.stm. (accessed on February 12, 2008). 
6 Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions, A Comparative Analysis of France, Russian and 
China (London: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 23. 
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state-building formula in Iraq as well as offer theoretical insight into the difference 
between state-building during the multi-polar colonial era and state-building in the 
current global environment.   
The main conclusion in this research stems from the analysis of the operating 
environments facing the two invading forces.  The international relations spectrum and 
global trajectories as well as the existing political and social institutions of the two 
occupation eras differ drastically.  Political and social structures in Iraq have changed 
drastically over the last portion of the twentieth century.  When the British secured its 
Mandate from the League of Nations, Iraq did not have a unified country falling under 
the auspices of one capital.  Instead the country was divided into three provinces: Mosul, 
Baghdad and Basra.  Iraq, known to the West at that time as Mesopotamia, was still 
immersed in the institutions and influences of the Ottoman Empire and accordingly 
lacked any strong semblance of nationalist sentiment.  Any sort of unifying force in Iraq 
had been quashed by the Ottoman “tanzimats” (re-organization) in which “Turkishness” 
was emphasized.7  Reaction to the Ottoman tanzimat came in the form of “Arabization” 
in Iraq, which emphasized Arabic language use and Arab political appointments.8  The 
invading British forces managed to expel the Ottomans from Iraq before Arabization 
could take strong roots within the country and thus were more easily able to occupy a 
disjointed country.       
On the other hand, the U.S. invaded a unified, albeit restive, Iraq with an existing 
central government.  The Iraq that the United States invaded was in fact created by the 
legacy of the British.  The existing central government was defined by the dominance of 
the Sunni minority, a political facet dating back to the Gertrude Bell era of Iraqi history.  
The aftereffects of the Iran-Iraq War, the First Gulf War and long standing United 
Nations sanctions had transformed a once wealthy country into a stagnant and repressive 
state.  Any chance for reconstruction or economic rehabilitation had been severely 
                                                 
7 David Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1989), 28. 
8 Ibid.,  28. 
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constrained by large debts and international demand for Gulf War reparations.9  The Iraq 
which the U.S. invaded was a country that had experienced (in the period of less than two 
decades) the loss of two-thirds of its GDP, soaring unemployment, dramatic losses in 
educational institutions and a precipitous loss of skilled professionals.10  The bleak 
numbers and statistics of pre-invasion Iraq supports the notion that the U.S. invaded a 
considerably more troubled country than their British counterparts and thus any 
democratic state building venture would be significantly dissimilar.       
Another point of divergence in the two invasions, which has analytical 
implications, is the actual impetus behind the initial attacks.  The British entered Iraq just 
before the collapse of Ottoman Empire.  The British utilized the colonial institutions of 
the India Office to establish an administration in Iraq in an attempt to assert dominance in 
the region and also secure economic resources.  The British Mandate’s colonial, direct-
rule foundation contrasts with the U.S. self protective motivation to create an American-
style democracy in Iraq.  Despite the differences in the two countries motivations, both 
were self-serving and resulted in general confusion and befuddlement in reference to 
Iraq’s fate.  The British policy was initially uncertain and confused while the American 
administration was caught off-guard and bewildered by the sudden power vacuum in the 
wake of Saddam’s overthrow.  In the end, both the U.S. and Britain had to decide what 
system of state-building would be the most beneficial for Iraq’s future as well as their 
own.   
Throughout the course of this research, I expect to find that the different eras in 
which the British and American invasions occurred will play strongly into the framework 
of Iraqi state-building.  The British Mandate was awarded at the start of post-colonialism 
following World War I.  Wilsonian notions of self-determination and liberal divergence 
from imperialism were consistent with post-World War I allied sentiment that 
“populations ought not to be bandied about without regard to their own wishes as if they 
                                                 
9 Abbas Alnasrawi, “Iraq: Economic Sanctions and Consequences, 1990-2000,” Third World 
Quarterly, Vol. 22 (April 2001), 217. 
10 Ibid.,  214.  
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were property.”11  The American invasion occurred during a post-Cold War era where 
the U.S. was an apparent uni-polar hegemon.  The chronological gap separating the two 
eras of foreign presence in Iraq created conditions that significantly shaped the efforts of 
the state-building struggle.   
Chapter II of this thesis is a historical study of the British Mandate and American 
invasion into Iraq.  This chapter will briefly examine the political, social and economic 
environment preceding and subsequent to the invasion.  Chapter II will also address the 
issue of the different starting points or operational environments that the British and 
American forces encountered.  Chapter III will examine the ideological differences in 
motivation for the invasion.  This chapter will look at the moral, philosophical and 
economic impetus for the British Mandate and the United States invasion.  In particular, 
the section outlines British colonial, imperialist ideology and contrasts it to American 
neoconservative and protectionist ideologies.      
Chapter IV examines the link between pre-existing conditions and the invasions 
that could have affected the policies and their supposed failures.  More importantly, 
Chapter IV will show how the intrusions into Iraq occurred in two different eras in 
“world time” and as such, external and internal conditions had significant affects on the 
follow-on foreign presence.  Finally, after examining the two operational environments 
and their separate time periods, Chapter V explains that although a taking the lessons 
learned approach to the Iraqi state-building seems to make historical sense, the disparity 
of the invasions makes this approach imperfect.  Chapter V will examine evidence for the 
hypothesis that the incongruence of the British and U.S. experiences has created an 
entirely different state-building venture for the current U.S. administration.     
A. LITERATURE REVIEW 
To fully understand the circumstances of the British Mandate and the current 
American presence in Iraq, one must closely examine the unique and turbulent history of 
Mesopotamia.  Echoes of the Ottoman occupation and other foreign influences 
                                                 
11 Ernest B. Haas, “The Reconciliation of Conflicting Colonial Policy Aims: Acceptance of the 
League of Nations Mandate System,” International Organization, Vol. 6. No. 4 (November 1954): 522. 
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significantly shaped Iraq identity throughout the twentieth century and beyond.  The 
Modern History of Iraq by Phebe Marr and A History of Iraq by Charles Tripp offer 
detailed historical studies of the country during its fledgling years.  Although both 
authors cover the topic of Iraqi history, Marr tends to use more analytically driven 
commentary while Tripp favors an in-depth date-by-date account of history.  Throughout 
her historical analysis, Marr transitions in a more fluid and effective manner.  For 
example, Marr’s description of the major demographic groups (Shi’a, Sunni and Kurds) 
in the introductory chapter is helpful in setting up the social identity of the country during 
ancient Mesopotamia and prior to the Islamic empires.   
Marr also briefly touches on the role of Arab nationalism at the conclusion of the 
Ottoman rule.  However, she states that although it had sown seeds “among a small 
educated group,” the sense of nationalism had not taken root among the population.  The 
country was instead still drawn together by tribal, familial and religious ties rather than 
sense of national unity.  Marr cites that prior to the British Mandate, there was no Iraq 
and that the British rule created a state containing the Western institutions of a 
constitution, bureaucracy and parliamentary rule.12  Marr also writes that the British rule 
left three major impressions on the Iraqi state: a hastening of modernization, an 
“Arabization” of administration, and the creation of a real nationalist movement.13  These 
unintended consequences were not evident until later in the Mandate as the British 
interjected influence into Iraqi politics. 
Both Marr and Tripp make pointed references to the fact that the British were 
uncertain about what policies to pursue in Iraq.  Marr writes that “for much of Britain’s 
tenure in Iraq, its policy was vacillating and indecisive”14 while Tripp notes, “The British 
themselves were undecided about its [Iraq’s] future—notoriously so, as the Iraqis found 
to their bewilderment.”15  The indecision of the British colonial India Office would 
eventually result in its political officers relying on the “imperial school” learned from 
                                                 
12 Phebe Marr, A Modern History of Iraq (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985), 29. 
13 Ibid.,  29. 
14 Ibid.,  29. 
15 Charles Tripp, A History of Iraq (Cambridge: University Press, 2002), 36. 
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colonial experience in India.  As a result, the British consolidated the administration of 
the three pre-existing provinces under a single unit and in effect created artificial Iraqi 
borders.  
While Tripp’s account of the British administration in Iraq is very detailed and 
historically specific, Marr again gives more of an analytical description of the ideology 
driving the British occupation.  She writes that India Office was driven by the philosophy 
of “the white man’s burden” which was based upon the notion of direct rule and the 
distrust of the ability of the occupied to rule themselves.  This philosophy and cultural 
imperialism derived from the schools of thought espoused by John Stuart Mills who held 
firm in his belief that force was needed for social democratic transformation and that 
indigenous traditions were wholly inadequate.16  Eventually, under the auspices of 
Gertrude Bell, the British approved of the concept of Iraqi self-government under 
“British tutelage.”17   
Tripp and Marr document the transition to Iraqi self-governance with the British 
introduction of King Faisal.  Tripp writes that King Faisal, despite his appointed position, 
was a “sovereign of a state that itself was not sovereign.”18  Upon recognizing his 
tenuous position, the new monarch set out to achieve two difficult tasks: 1) gain real 
independence from British control and 2) integrate the communities of Iraq into a single, 
inclusive system.19  King Faisal quickly realized that freeing Iraq from British influence 
was a particularly hard task, but to his advantage, there existed a popular opposition 
towards the Mandate.  Eventually, the British and the Iraqis compromised with the 
signing of a treaty which gave the “appearance of a normal relationship between two 
sovereign states.”20   
                                                 
16 Stanley Kurtz, “Democratic Imperialism: A Blueprint,” Policy Review (April/May 2003), 
http://www/hoover.org/publiciations/policyreview/344917.html (accessed February 12, 2008). 
17 Tripp, 39. 
18 Ibid., 49. 
19 Ibid., 50. 
20 Ibid., 52. 
 8
In the conclusion of the British Mandate chapter of his book, Tripp describes the 
circumstances of the admission of Iraq into the League of Nations and the start of the 
Hashemite Monarchy.  On the other hand, Marr marks a transition from British 
occupation to an “era of instability”.  In her historical analysis, she states that the end of 
the mandate brought about a period of disillusion and uneasiness as there was an 
immediate breakdown of Iraqi unity.21   
Although his book does not exclusively address the British Mandate, but instead 
tells the story of foreign influence over the entire region, David Fromkin’s A Peace to 
End all Peace offers insight into the growing unease among the Arabs in Iraq and the 
surrounding territories.  Fromkin’s account of the turbulence in the Middle East is 
generally focused on the time period punctuated by World War I and the collapse of the 
Ottoman Empire.  The author also addresses the fragility in Iraqi identity during the 
British occupation.  When referencing the animosity between the Shi’a and Sunni 
communities, the author writes, “Mesopotamia provinces experienced incoherence, 
communal strife and habitual discord--rather than organized nationalism.”22  Fromkin 
also mentions the relative uneasiness and skepticism the British were experiencing during 
their occupation.  He cites an August 1920 London Times article lamenting “We are 
spending sums in Mesopotamia and in Persia which may well reach a hundred million 
pounds this year [in support of] the foolish policy of the Government in the Middle 
East.”23    
William Polk also documents British frustration about the costly and dangerous 
occupation in his book Understanding Iraq.  Polk also compares British historical issues 
to America’s current tribulations.  He contends that the British occupied Iraq in order to 
counter the possible rise of Pan-Islamism in the region subsequent the Ottoman 
collapse.24   This is similar to the American pre-emptive goals of stabilization and the 
                                                 
21 Marr, 55. 
22 Fromkin, 58.  
23 Ibid.,  452. 
24 William R. Polk, Understanding Iraq: The Whole Sweep of Iraqi History from Genghis Khan’s 
Mongols to the Ottoman Turks to the British Mandate to the American Occupation (New York: Harpers 
Collins, 2005), 68.  
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elimination of terrorist threats in the region.  Polk writes that the British tried to occupy 
“on the cheap” with limited military presence and the expectation of living off of the land 
while developing the Iraqi economy.25  This again is similar to the controversial initial 
troop levels and American intentions of financing Iraqi reconstruction through oil 
revenues.  Unfortunately, as history has shown, neither plan worked in full.  The lack of 
sufficient troop levels resulted in a protracted revolt against the British, which was only 
quelled through the use of air power and chemical weapons.  Additionally, the British 
were successful in developing only five hundred square miles of food producing land and 
conducted meager attempts at simple equipment manufacturing.26  The lack of sufficient 
American troop presence has haunted the U.S. efforts and has only been partially 
resolved by the 2007 troop surge.  Despite American expectation, Iraqi oil production 
during 2007 was less than half of anticipated capacity.27  Moreover, a recent report found 
that the Iraqi government had utilized only 24% of the $10 billion budget set aside for 
reconstruction.28   
Polk states that a principle part of the Iraqi agenda was to reduce expenditures, 
decrease the military presence, and end the occupation.  However, this was not going to 
happen until “such a time as it [the Iraqi government] can stand by itself, when the 
Mandate will come to an end.”29  This dogged and misguided policy is also referred to in 
Toby Dodge’s Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation Building and a History Denied.  
Although Inventing Iraq touches briefly on Iraqi history, Dodge is more focused on a 
direct comparison of British and American experience in Iraq.  The shortfall of his book 
is that it was written in 2003, shortly after the initial invasion.  Dodge includes a preface 
for his 2005 edition of Inventing Iraq in which he provides an assessment of the U.S. 
presence in Iraq for the previous two years.  The author accurately predicts the course of 
                                                 
25 Polk., 72. 
26 Ibid, 72. 
27 Peter Grier, “Iraqi’s Oil Production Falls Short of Goals,” Christian Science Monitor, May 7, 2007, 
http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0507/p01s02-wome.html?page=1 (accessed February 18, 2008). 
28 James Glanz, “Senate Committee Seeks Audit of Iraqi Oil Money,” New York Times, March 8, 
2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/09/world/middleeast/09iraq.html?fta=y (accessed February 18, 
2008). 
29 Polk, 78.  
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the American policy when he writes “the probability is that President Bush, while still in 
office will continue to ‘gamble on resurrection’...because the political and personal costs 
of radical change, in effect of admitting defeat, would be too great.”30 
The concept of defeat or failure of democratic state building in Iraq is dealt with 
in George McGovern and William Polk’s Out of Iraq and in Noah Feldman’s What We 
Owe Iraq.  McGovern and Polk focus on the international implications of failure in Iraq.  
They highlight the extreme financial burden and human costs of the continued presence 
in Iraq.  The authors also discuss the political and moral losses that the United States has 
suffered as a result of their actions in Iraq.  Although McGovern and Polk offer a very 
detailed twenty-four point plan for Iraqi exit, they fail to answer a critical question should 
the United States abruptly withdraw from Iraq: what about internal and regional 
insecurity?  They briefly address the question in their conclusion, “The likely result will 
be greatly increased regional insecurity …creat[ing] conditions in which warfare is likely, 
not only within and among the major ethnic and religious sections of Iraqi society, but 
also with neighboring countries.”31  McGovern and Polk leave this issue unaddressed and 
simply state, “These effects will have unpredictable but pernicious consequences.”32  
Their failure to provide a remedy for instability weakens the argument for withdrawal. 
On the other hand, in What We Owe Iraq, Feldman acknowledges the moral 
obligation and practical dilemmas the United States faces in the Iraqi state building 
venture.  He states that we need some sort of model of how to proceed in Iraq, but this 
model should not be based off of the British experience.  Feldman cites a possible 
solution reminiscent of the Lebanese Confessional system, which would involve “elected 
elites sharing power and distributing resources roughly in proportion to the relative 
numbers of different groups in the population, while respecting basic civil liberties.”33  
                                                 
30 Dodge,  xxxvii. 
31 George McGovern and William Polk, Out of Iraq: A Practical Plan for Withdrawal Now (New 
York: Simon and Schuster Paperbacks, 2006), 123. 
32 Ibid., 124. 
33 Noah Feldman, What We Owe Iraq: War and the Ethics of Nation Building (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2004), 32. 
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However, as Lebanese political history has shown, proportional power sharing while 
respecting basic civil liberties is an arduous and sometimes impossible task.   
Feldman wrestles with the moral implications of embarking on a state building 
mission without a blueprint.  He contends that the United States lacked a blueprint 
because it pursued Iraqi regime change and subsequent state building for its own interests 
and not the Iraqi peoples’ interest.  He asks “why should the United States—with or 
without the UN’s assistance—succeed where the British and League of Nations had 
failed?”34  The question of how and why the United States and Iraq should succeed in 
state building is the central question of current American foreign policy in the Middle 
East.  Given what can be learned from the British Mandate, as well as an analysis of the 
dissimilar current operating environment in Iraq, can the United States and Iraqi 
government develop a state-building solution with a more stable legacy than that of the 
British Occupation?     
                                                 
34 Feldman, 32. 
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II. A HISTORICAL COMPARISON 
Throughout the course of Operation Iraqi Freedom, and in some part Operation 
Enduring Freedom, the mantras have been “we should learn from the lessons of Japan 
and Germany” and “we should learn from the lessons of the British.”  There are 
remarkable similarities between the British and American ventures, which will be 
discussed later in this chapter.  The fact remains, however, that that geo-political and 
societal start points of the two occupations are vastly dissimilar.  Moreover, because of 
the U.S. position as the sole super-power, its stake in Iraq and follow-on legacy is may be 
more critical than that of the British Mandate.    
A historical analysis of the invasions and the events surrounding them can offer 
insight as to why a direct “apples to apples” comparison is not entirely valid.  This 
chapter’s first section will give a brief overview of Mesopotamia and Iraq’s turbulent 
political history and the major actors to include the Ottomans, the British and the 
Americans.  Chapter II also dissects the historical origins behind each invasion and 
explains how they influenced the subsequent foreign presence and state building eras in 
Iraq.  Additionally, this chapter will lay the groundwork for Chapter III’s further analysis 
of the ideological motivations of the invasions and now their moral and political 
underpinnings shaped the state building processes. 
A. MESOPOTAMIA – A BRIEF HISTORY 
Mesopotamia has experienced its lion’s share of empires, rulers, monarchs, 
dictators and occupation.  Prior to the Islamic Empires and conquests during the seventh 
century, Mesopotamia had seen several civilizations form and disappear.  Iraq historian 
Phebe Marr writes that Mesopotamian empires began with the Akkadians in 2400 B.C.E. 
after they conquered the pre-existing Sumerian city-states.35  Subsequent empires 
followed the Akkadians including the Babylonians, Kassites, and the Assyrians.36  The 
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early Mesopotamian empires generated numerous cultural, scientific and literary 
contributions.  The institutions and traditions of the Mesopotamian empires were upended 
by Alexander the Great’s conquest of the Middle East.37  Marr asserts that Alexander’s 
introduction of Hellenistic ideas and “scientific rationalism” helped paved the way for the 
Islamic era.38  The Battle of al-Qadisiyyah in 637 C.E. signaled the beginning of another 
era of foreign invasion.39  It was during the early periods of the first Islamic century 
punctuated by Arab-Islamic rivalries and Husayn’s death that Mesopotamia gained its 
enduring reputation of being a land difficult to rule.40   
The Islamic territories in Iraq were incorporated into the Ottoman Empire during 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.41  The Ottomans attempted to expand their 
domain while at the same time counter the influence of their regional challenger, the 
Persians.42  Mesopotamia was designated with the new name of “Iraq” and 
administratively divided into three provinces: Mosul, Baghdad and Basra.43  The 
Ottomans exercised direct rule through appointed governors (usually Turkish) and 
generally abstained from interfering with local traditions and customs. The new rulers 
simply considered Iraq as a revenue generating territory.  During the early nineteenth 
century the Ottoman Empire began to opt for more direct rule policies due to the 
emergence of regional European interests and the growing influence of Egypt.44  
Subsequently, the Ottomans began the “Tanzimat” (Reforms) and restructured their 
policies in landholding, education and conscription.45   
The Ottoman Empire’s grasp on the Arab territories weakened during the years 
preceding World War I.  Europe had regained interest in the region it had previously 
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considered inconsequential.  Britain in particular recognized that Iraq and the Euphrates 
River provided a much more appealing link to India than the long voyage around the 
Horn of Africa.46   Realizing that Western powers, led by Britain, were quickly 
expanding their interests in the Middle East, the Ottomans sought to ally with the 
Germans.47  The Ottomans also attempted to re-assert their authority and military 
capabilities in the region by emphasizing “Turkishness” and limiting political freedom.48  
Reaction to these measures created the beginning of Arab nationalism, or “Arabism,” 
which focused on three major tenants: 1) decentralization of the prior administrations, 2) 
use of Arabic language rather than Turkish in schools and 3) political appointment of 
Arabs instead of Turks.49  The British seized upon the opportunity for change in the 
regional power balance and formed a coalition with Arab Nationalists.  In 1914, the 
British mobilized into Iraq and began their conquest and eventual occupation. 
B. THE BRITISH OCCUPATION 
The British initially invaded southern Iraq in order to protect their oil interests 
against the Ottomans and the Central powers.  The British Navy had recently converted 
from coal power to oil driven engines and on the eve of World War I, oil interests were 
critical.50  As the war progressed, Britain began to entrench itself in Iraq and following 
the Armistice of Mudro had effectually occupied the entire country.  In the absence of 
indigenous authority, the new occupiers took upon themselves the task of establishing a 
new order in Iraq.  High Commissioner A. T. Wilson claimed that Iraq had no competent 
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dissolution.”51  Gertrude Bell, the Oriental Secretary to the Commissioner, echoed these 
sentiments, claimed that the Iraqi population was mostly passive, and approved of British 
rule.52 
The British quickly set out to replace the Ottoman political system with its own 
administrative institutions.  Upon their arrival to Iraq, Wilson and his political officers 
promptly applied the policies of the British-Indian school of colonialism.  Modeling their 
administration from the Indian imperial school, the British divided Iraq into political 
districts, established an Anglo-Indian justice system and incorporated the Indian rupee as 
the currency of choice.53       
The United Nations awarded the British the Iraqi mandate in 1920 following the 
San Remo Conference.  The mandate translated into colonialism which was not 
particularly appealing in the eyes of the Iraqis.  Eventually the clerics, the Shi’a in 
particular, began to speak out against the mandate and occupation.  Imam Mohammed 
Tahi al-Shirazi issued a fatwa which stated that “none but Moslems have any right to rule 
over Moslems.”54  Armed with this fatwa, Iraqi religious leaders and nationalists 
fomented a rebellion in 1920.  The British were not prepared for the insurrection or the 
guerilla tactics that it entailed.  The occupying forces suffered more than 2,200 casualties 
and spent approximately forty million pounds.55  Discontent of the occupation was not 
limited to Iraq and its citizens.  English citizens were increasingly dissatisfied with 
occupation in terms of costs and along ideological grounds.  T.E. Lawrence claimed that 
the British occupation was no better than the previous Ottoman rule: 
Our rule is worse than the old Turkish system.  They kept fourteen 
thousand local Conscripts and killed a yearly average of two hundred 
Arabs in maintaining  peace.  We keep ninety thousand men, with 
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areoplanes, amoured cars, gunboats and armoured trains.  We killed about 
ten thousand Arabs in this rising this summer.56  
Although the 1920 revolt had been diffused, it was the genesis of Iraqi 
nationalism and revealed the desire for identity and self-interests in the foundation of the 
state.57  The British were keenly aware of the Iraqi desire for self rule and replaced 
Wilson with Sir Percy Cox as the Higher Commissioner in Iraq.  His three primary duties 
were 1) ending military administration, 2) creation of a popularly approved constitution 
and 3) establishment of a government with an Arab president.58     
Cox adhered to the language of the mandate requiring that the British establish 
and nurture an emerging Iraqi government.  Sensing public unrest both at home and 
abroad, the British parliament enacted the Administrative Inspectorate Law of 1923 
which hastened the transition of the occupiers from administrators to advisors.59  Cox and 
his new staff agreed that “The Iraqi Government must be allowed to make mistakes and 
learn by them during this probationary period, provided that such mistakes are not of a 
nature to lead to disaster.”60  Due to the unpopularity of direct rule in Iraq, the British 
sought out an Arab leader who would be “malleable” under the terms of the mandate.61  
After significant persuasion by Cox, the Iraqi Council of State approved the appointment 
of Faysal ibn Husayn as the first king or Iraq.62  King Faysal brought with him loyal 
supporters who harbored Arab nationalist sentiments while at the same time were 
amenable to the British mandate.63  In addition to his de facto appointment of King 
Faysal, Cox also decided that the Sunnis should hold a dominant position in Iraqi 
politics.64  Gertrude Bell had previously advised A.T. Wilson that working through the 
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Sunni nationalists would be more prudent than coordinating with the Shi’a tribes and 
clerics whom she categorized as “reactionary and obscurantists.”65   
Despite having a monarch, the Iraqi government remained subject to external 
pressure and interference.  The new administration was in limbo as a “quasi-colony, 
quasi-independent” state.66  Continued division within Iraq along tribal, sectarian and 
religious lines allowed for easy manipulation.   Although the 1920 revolt had spurred the 
beginnings of Iraqi nationalism, the inability to build a broad consensus among the 
population had constrained the nationalist movement.67  King Faysal did not hold any 
delusions being completely sovereign and thus could not create a broad following or 
ignite nationalist sentiment.  He knew that despite being regarded as a Sayyid 
(descendant of the prophet), he was also considered by the Iraqis as an interloper.68  
Regardless of his questionable legitimacy, King Faysal maintained his throne for twelve 
years, during which the British maintained their influence over internal Iraqi politics. 
In 1931, the League Mandates Commission reluctantly acknowledged that Iraq 
had fulfilled its requirements for admittance into the League of Nations.69  The League 
expressed their concerns about the future treatment of minority groups (the Kurds, 
Assyrians, Turkomens, and Yazidis) within Iraq.  The Assyrians in particular held 
trepidations about their future security as they had been used by the British as proxy 
military forces.70  The Iraqi government agreed to the League’s requirement of minority 
protection and was unanimously approved membership in the League of Nations in 
1932.71  The British Mandate ended in 1932, however, informal British influence and 
interference would continue for more than two decades.      
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C. THE U.S. INVASION AND CONTINUED INVOLVEMENT IN IRAQ 
The exact motivation for the U.S. invasion into Iraq is controversial and 
convoluted.  As George Packer writes in The Assassins Gate, “The answer has something 
to with September 11.  But what exactly?”72  In his contention that the Iraq war was a 
necessity, former Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith claims that “Iraq policy was 
re-examined in light of our post-9/11 sense of vulnerability.”73  The Bush 
administration’s rationale and justification for invading Iraq will be discussed in Chapter 
Three of this thesis.   Motivation aside, the U.S. intent to pursue military action into Iraq 
had its genesis long before the 9/11 attacks.  A regime changing invasion into Iraq had 
been mulled during the conclusion of the first Gulf War.  Ultimately the U.S. military 
leadership and the first Bush administration nixed the idea after realizing that the entire 
Arab world would strenuously object.  The American administration was also hoping and 
predicting that Saddam would fall from power due to internal turmoil.74  This obviously 
did not happen and Iraq, and the oppressive Hussein regime, would remain a point of 
contention in American foreign policy in the Middle East.   
Because of his legacy of using chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq War, the 
U.S. was deeply suspicious about Saddam’s Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) 
programs.  In 1998, the U.S. and the United Kingdom launched Operation Desert Fox in 
an attempt to hamper Iraqi WMD manufacturing.   During his 2002 State of the Union 
address, President George W. Bush referred to Iraq as a member of the “Axis of Evil” 
and asserted that “This regime has something to hide from the world.”75  One year later 
on March 20, 2003, the U.S. invaded Iraq.  
 The initial American invasion and “conquest” of Iraq was significantly easier than 
the British invasion a century prior.  During their invasion, the British faced an organized 
Ottoman army which was able to draw reinforcements quickly through conscriptions.  
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Following its relatively uncontested landing in Basra, the British army’s advance onto 
Baghdad took eighteen months and endured tens of thousands of casualties.76  The siege 
of Kut where over 13,000 British troops surrendered to the Ottomans is testimony as to 
the difficulty of the British conquest.77  On the other hand, by the time President Bush 
announced the end of military operations in Iraq in May 03, the U.S invasion and 
complete occupation had taken less than three months with the loss of 176 American 
service members.78   
 Overwhelming U.S. military success in its initial campaign against the Iraqi Army 
was attributed to a variety of factors.  A recent Rand Study report cited that Iraqi 
resistance was weak due to a combination of Saddam’s miscalculations, poorly managed 
battlefield operations, inferior equipment, poor motivation and inferior warfighting 
capabilities.79  The U.S. Army quickly crushed the Iraqi army despite its relatively small 
invasion force of approximately 145,000 troops and 500 tanks and armored vehicles 
facing the much larger Iraqi army of 400,000 troops and 4,000 tanks and armored 
vehicles.80  The U.S. Air Force and the numerous bombing sorties it executed played a 
key role in diminishing the Iraqi Army’s numerical advantage.  During the opening 
salvos of the invasion the Iraqi army leadership was in shambles and the Saddam regime 
continued to deny the presence and impending engulfment of American forces.  
Confusion and delusion was widespread among the Iraqi army high echelons.  During the 
famous Third Infantry Division’s “Thunder Run” into Baghdad, American troops 
captured an Iraqi colonel who accidentally drove his car into a Bradley while on his way 
to work.81  The colonel, having been misinformed by government media sources, was 
unaware that U.S. forces were in Baghdad.82   
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 The rapid and complete collapse of the Iraqi army and Saddam’s regime was a 
surprise to all involved parties.  However, the celebrations in Washington and in Iraq 
were short lived.  The newly liberated country quickly dissolved into a virtual anarchy 
with criminal elements and activity becoming the norm.  U.S. military and civilian 
leadership were unprepared and unclear as to how to respond.   
Despite the growing chaos, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld remained 
unconcerned, “Stuff happens…and it’s untidy, and freedom’s untidy, and free people are 
free to make mistakes and commit crimes and do bad things.”83  In contrast to 
Rumsfeld’s perceptions, the American troops on the ground recognized the seriousness of 
the situation.  A U.S. Marine Corps officer ominously wrote that “A finite supply of 
goodwill towards the Americans evaporated with the passing of each anarchic day.”84  
Iraqi response to American passivity in response to the looting was bitter.  Conspiracy 
theories began to sprout reference the U.S. ability to protect the Oil ministry but not the 
Baghdad Antiquities Museum or the Mosul Museum of Antiquities.85  Some Iraqis also 
suspiciously believed that the Americans were complicit in the looting in order to secure 
future reconstruction contracts.86  Eventually lawlessness gave way to attempts of self-
security through militias and armed gangs.  Civilian militancy grew until the U.S. found 
itself pitted against a full-fledged insurgency.        
 The Bush administration realized that despite the initial success of the invasion, 
the military could not fill the leadership void or fully quell the lawlessness in the Iraq.  
Shortly following the invasion, military authority in Iraq remained in the Combined 
Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) commanded by LTG McKeirnan.  Civilian 
authority resided in the Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (OHRA) 
led by former General Jay Garner.  The working relationship between the two 
organizations was never clearly defined which created confusion with very little tangible 
post-invasion progress.  Moreover, a lack of communication or mission understanding 
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between the two components hampered the effectiveness of the OHRA.  Early OHRA 
preparations detailed reconstruction plans which coincided with military movement into 
Iraq.  For example, once the southern city of Basra was secured, the OHRA would enter 
the city, presumably secured by the military, to begin reconstruction projects.87  
However, unbeknownst to the OHRA, CLFCC had already decided on plans to invade all 
the way to Baghdad—leaving no rear security element for reconstruction efforts.88 
State Department officials recognized the OHRA’s ineffectualness and created the 
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), which had more authority.89   As chief of the 
CPA, former Ambassador Paul Bremer was given the task of finding a solution to this 
new mess in Iraq.  His two critical tasks were to reestablish order and revitalize 
government services.90   Bremer subsequently implemented three policies which would 
have resounding consequences throughout post-invasion Iraq: 1) De-Baathification, 2) 
dissolution of the Iraqi army and 3) elimination of unprofitable state run industries.91  
One of Bremer’s allies, Undersecretary of Defense Feith, justified the dissolution of the 
army by asserting that it had “already disbanded itself” and that “These actions 
[Bremer’s] are part of a robust campaign to show the Iraqi people that the Saddam regime 
is gone, and will never return.”92   
Bremer’s decision immediately created Iraqi dissension and there was a palpable 
transition in perceiving the U.S. as a liberator to seeing the foreign administration as 
occupiers.  In the days that followed, a CPA staff member supposedly lamented that “My 
personal belief is that the insurrection in Iraq is a result of those initial policy mistakes—
failure to stop the looting, failure to establish firm control right away and the initial 
decisions made when Bremer came in…”93   
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 Doubts about the legitimacy of the U.S. intervention into Iraq also pervaded the 
international community.  The U.S. had sought international assistance from a “Coalition 
of the Willing” after realizing the seriousness of the deteriorating situation in Iraq94  
However, a few major global players, namely Russia, France and Germany, were 
reluctant to support the initial invasion and were thus curtailed from participating in post-
invasion reconstruction and stability efforts.  Other countries withheld support because 
they did not “want to appear to have supported the war by engaging in postwar efforts.”95  
Of the approximately 85 countries that the U.S. appealed to for post-invasion assistance, 
only 48 counties were tallied as members of the coalition in 2003.96  Coalition numbers 
would dwindle considerably and by 2007 only 25 countries would remain as troop-
providing supporters in Operation Iraq Freedom.97  This number further shrank to 17 
coalition partners in 2008.98                  
Like their British Mandate predecessors, Bremer and the Coalition Provisional 
Authority, took upon themselves the task of reasserting a central authority over the Iraqis.  
The U.S. administration had assigned Bremer and his staff this job according to the 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483 that granted the Coalition broad 
authority to administer in Iraq until a legitimate government could be established.99  This 
commitment was uncannily similar to the League of Nation’s mandate that prescribed 
British administration for “a people not yet able to stand by themselves under the 
strenuous conditions of the modern world.”100   The resolution’s actual wording didn’t 
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seem to give the same broad scope of mandate authority as the 1920 League of Nations 
Article 22.  However, the resolution clearly indicated the desire of external aid, 
“Stressing the right of the Iraqi people freely to determine their own political future and 
control their own natural resources, welcoming the commitment of all parties concerned 
to support the creation of an environment in which they may do so as quickly as 
possible.”101   
Official transfer of authority occurred on June 30, 2004 ending the official period 
of “occupation” as prescribed the UN Security Council.102  At that time, Iraqi officials 
and the U.S. administration renegotiated the terms for continued American presence and 
created Multi-National Force Iraq (MNF-I).103 After the transfer of authority, the CPA 
ceased to exist and foreign authority was exercised through coordination of MNF-I and 
the new American embassy.104 The UN subsequently extended authorization for foreign 
presence and stated it was at the request of the interim Iraqi government.105   
The interim Iraqi government readily requested an extension of American 
presence and administration due to the tenuous security situation.  At this point, the post-
invasion insurgency was inflicting a costly toll on the population and the coalition forces. 
The U.S. administration and the State Department were startled by the scope and ferocity 
of the insurgency.  In a stroke of irony, Saddam Hussein had accurately believed that an 
insurgency was inevitable as the Iraqi people would not stand to be occupied or 
conquered.106  The common perception in the Bush administration was that the Iraqis 
would welcome the Americans as liberators and thus pacifying the country would not be 
a difficult task.  The administration was optimistically hoping to ride the wave of 
goodwill and hand over the country to Iraqi expatriates who would quickly establish an 
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American-style democratic government.107 The administration was also especially 
confident that the previously oppressed Sh’ia would support the U.S.   
Although Grand Ayatollah Sistani did not issue a fatwa calling for action against 
the U.S. invasion, the Shi’a community did not provide the assumed bastion of support 
for the Americans. Instability and intra-sectarian turbulence within the Shi’a hampered 
and even precluded any whole scale support from the community.108  The U.S. 
administration also had concerns about Sunni dissension.  Being the former power 
holders in Iraq, the Sunni had the most to lose as the result of Bremer’s de-Baathification 
measures.  Moreover, the Sunnis harbored trepidation that their community would be 
held responsible for the Saddam’s past transgression.109  After initial reluctance and 
boycotting of elections, the Sunni leadership gradually asserted themselves into the new 
Iraqi political system.  In early 2005, former Sunni militant leaders urged that it was time 
for a “new Jihad” which entailed turning from fighting to politics and as such, the Sunnis 
returned to politics, albeit to vote against the newly drafted constitution.110 
Sunni political participation highlights one of the many signs of progress that the 
Iraqis and U.S. administration have accomplished during its involvement in Iraq.  
Unfortunately these episodes of success are overshadowed by bleak accounts of political 
failure, economic stagnation, sectarian strife and insurgent spawned terror.  The 
American military casualty count totals more than four thousand deaths and Iraqi losses 
amount to hundreds of thousands.  Some reports even estimate that Iraqi deaths have 
reached an excess of one million.111  Iraqi oil production in 2007 was at half of the 
anticipated production rates as envisioned by the U.S. administration.112  Sectarian 
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violence reached record highs during 2006 following the Golden Mosque bombing.  The 
insurgency in Iraq is still rampant despite lauded “Surge” successes.  For the U.S. 
military and coalition forces, 2007 has been the deadliest year since the initial invasion 
with a record 2,592 deaths.  The insurgency’s deadliness and resiliency is a far cry from 
Vice President Cheney’s June 2005 declaration that the insurgency was in its “last 
throes.”  Overall, the general feelings of both the Iraqi and American population are of 
impatience and exhaustion—identical to the sentiments shared by their British and Iraqi 
counterparts in the century prior.   
D. MIRROR IMAGES 
The British and U.S. experiences in Iraq have historical similarities that help explain 
the current troubles in Iraq.  A brief description of these parallels will assist in framing 
Chapter Three’s analysis of the ideological motivations behind the two invasions.  
Although the invasions commenced from significantly different political and social 
starting points, it is only fair to mention their striking congruencies: 
1)  “Picking Sides” – Under the advisement of Gertrude Bell, the British decided 
that the Sunni should be the power brokers for the nascent state.  Although the 
U.S. has refrained from outright declarations, the Shi’a have replaced their 
formerly powerful Sunni counterparts and hold sway to much of the military 
leadership. 
2) Use of proxies – The British used Assyrian Levies in order to stabilize the state 
during rebellions.  The Assyrian would later pay the price in the absence of 
British protection.  During the early years of the occupation, U.S. forces allied 
with Kurdish militias, the Pesh Merga, in counter-insurgency efforts in 
Northern Iraq.  Moreover, the U.S. utilized individual Iraqi tribes to fight 
against elements of Al-Qaeda.  
3) Treaties – The British and Iraqi governments entered into the Anglo-Iraqi 
Treaty of 1930 in order to give the appearance of state sovereignty and reaffirm 
support.  The treaty was decidedly more beneficial for the British, however, the 
illusion of Iraqi sovereignty was propagated.  The U.S. and Iraqi government 
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signed a “Declaration of Principles” in November 2007.  Although the U.S. 
refrained from referring to the declaration as a treaty, Iraqi Foreign Minister 
Hoshyar Zabari called it “a long-term treaty.”113  Critics of the declaration fear 
that it will be used as a tool for prolonged and costly U.S. involvement in Iraq.  
4) Troops Strength – Analysis of both invasions indicates that total troop numbers 
were insufficient to properly sustain stability in the country.  The British 
resorted to airpower in order to compensate for insufficient troop strength when 
combating instability during the Mandate.  In response to continued post-
invasion instability, the U.S. deployed 155,000 troops in January 2005 to 
maintain security.  Strategists and analysts, to include the former Chief of Staff 
of the Army General Eric Shinseki, predicted that the occupation forces should 
total 400,000 to 500,000 in order to maintain nation-wide stability.114     
Although there are numerous more similarities in the British and American invasions, the 
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III. IDEOLOGICAL COMPARISONS 
Although Chapter II ended with a list of similarities between the invasions 
(picking sides, using proxies, treaties, and under strength troop deployments), there still 
exists glaring contrasting factors in the British and American experience.  For example, 
the British and American ideological motivations for invading Iraq have significant 
differences.  This chapter delves further into the historical underpinnings of the two 
countries rationale and perceived legitimacy for their invasions. The chapter’s first 
sections analyze and explain British imperialistic impulses despite the advent of the 
Mandate system.  The remainder of the chapter is devoted to scrutinizing the American 
transition from the self protectionist realism to pseudo-idealism and the spread of 
Western-styled democracy.         
During the waning years of World War I and the demise of the Ottoman Empire, 
Allied powers quickly realized the strategic and economic importance of Middle East.  
European and Russian powers began to jockey for positions of influence in the region and 
the politics of the Middle East became “explosive.”115  Eventually the struggle for 
control in the Middle East became a battle between England and the other European 
states (France in particular) and Russia.116  However, because of its imperial ventures of 
the previous centuries, England has stretched its colonial capabilities to their limits and 
resolved to not directly control the region but instead prevent its European counterparts 
and Russia from gaining control.117  Queen Victoria succinctly stated that English intent 
in the region was “a question of Russian or British Supremacy in the world.”118    
British self-serving motivations in Iraq were thinly veiled at best.  In a paper to 
the British Institute of International Affairs in 1924, British civil servant B. H. Bourdillon 
verbalized England’s initial intents for the 1914 Basra invasion.  He acknowledged that 
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England was bolstering the pre-existing Arab nationalist movement and fulfilling 
promises of support to Sharif Hussein.119  However Bourdillon also admitted to the less 
altruistic reason for the Basra incursion which was the protection of the Anglo-Persian oil 
fields.120  British self-interests and pre-occupation with other international matters such 
as the Treaty of Versailles and the emerging Zionists movement did not allow for timely 
or assertive policy decisions during the early days of occupation.121  Early indecision 
about the political future of Iraq would haunt the British throughout the course of the 
Mandate and cause years of administrative inefficiency and missteps.  
In a similar manner, the United States was equally confused about the future of 
the Iraqi state in the days after the 2003 invasion.  The “shock and awe” campaign 
quickly morphed into an indecisive and confused campaign of stabilization and state-
building.  Over-optimism and misperceptions by the American administration had 
resulted in a failure to plan for a postwar Iraq.122  However, this optimism and faith in 
democratic transitions and modern day “Wilsonianism” was one motivation behind the 
U.S. invasion into Iraq.  The pre-emptive war with Iraq was strongly based upon the 
“Bush Doctrine” and its premise that stability and security in the Middle East would be 
achieved through democracy.123  As a result, the U.S. embarked on a “benevolent” and 
arguably idealistically naive mission to invade and rebuild a new Iraq through a 
democratic framework and a re-invigoration of Iraqi nationalism.     
During the later period of the Mandate, the British recognized the importance of 
Iraqi nationalism transcending sectarian and cultural factionalism.  In a speech to the 
Grotius Society, Islamic and International law scholar S.G. Vesey-Fitzgerald stressed that 
“A federation of self-interest is much stronger than a purely centralized government of 
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discordant minorities.124”  The quintessential question arising out the current U.S. 
presence in Iraq is whether the country can re-establish and nurture a sense of nationalism 
strong enough to overcome its current internal divisions and rebuild a sovereign state.  
This chapter investigates the driving factors and motivations behind the two invasions 
into Iraq.  It also examines the effects of the dissimilar geo-political environment on the 
British and American invasion and mandate attitudes.   
A. THE MAKINGS OF THE BRITISH MANDATE 
The mandate system was created by the League of Nations in order to break from 
traditional imperialism which had been dominant in European foreign policy dating back 
to the seventeenth century.125  This system was a new approach to colonial policy and 
was premised on eliminating the practice of annexation.126  A liberal divergence from 
imperialism was consistent with post-World War I allied sentiment that “populations 
ought not to be bandied about without regard to their own wishes as if they were 
property.”127  President Woodrow Wilson voiced the same sentiment in his argument that 
the right to self-determination was one of the necessary conditions for international and 
domestic stability.128  The British, in keeping with the trend of the day, agreed that a 
mandate system would meet the intent of self-determination, however not to the complete 
extent envisioned by Wilson.  They approved of the League of Nation Covenant’s Article 
22 which articulated the necessity for a system of temporary mandates: 
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To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war 
have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly 
governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by 
themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there 
should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of 
such people form a sacred trust of civilization and that securities for the 
performance of this trust should be embodied in this covenant.129 
Eventually, much of the former Ottoman territory was “mandated” to the French and 
British who promptly drew boundary lines created during the earlier Sykes-Picot 
agreement.            
According to the Mandate system, the newly partitioned states would administer 
themselves under the tutelage of the Mandatory powers.130  Although the French and 
British claimed only to be marginally involved in internal politics, the real power 
remained in the appointed “High Commissioners” who acted as representatives of foreign 
powers.  In Iraq’s case, the High Commissioner Sir Percy Cox was responsible for 
eventual military withdrawal of British troops, creation of a popularly approved 
constitution, and the establishment of provisional Arab government.131  Sir Cox, along 
with the British administration, assumed the burden of the Iraqi tutelage and eventual 
state building. 
As previously mentioned, President Wilson’s notion of self-determination and his 
Fourteen Points had prompted the shift in French and English colonial policies.132  The 
European powers sought to be perceived as “humanitarian liberators” of the Arabs from 
the oppression of the Ottomans.133  When appealing for Iraqi political participation and 
cooperation, British General Stanley Maude implored “O people of Baghdad, remember 
that for 26 generations you suffered under strange tyrants…”134  It was under the guise of 
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helping the traumatized Mesopotamian state that the British found legitimacy in their 
occupation and Mandate.  Despite administrative and semantic denial to the contrary, 
indication of British control and influence over Iraqi state was evident and resented by 
the inhabitants.       
A. T. Wilson, with the assistance of British political officers, promptly eliminated 
the traditional Ottoman-styled municipal councils and replaced them with an imperial 
type system where order was maintained through local notables.135  Wilson then initiated 
a plebiscite inquiring as to the desired future shape of state and constitution that the Iraqis 
desired.  Although he claimed that results of this survey were inconclusive, Wilson 
reported a general Iraqi approval of British control.136  He stated that the Iraqis favored 
“Englishmen speaking Arabic” over French or American administrators.137  In fact, Iraqi 
merchants and traders preferred British rule over the Ottoman as it was more profitable 
for them.138  Their previous Ottoman occupiers had often been unscrupulous and prone to 
marketplace cheating.   
The actual results of the plebiscite found that a majority of the Iraqi favored 
division into three separate provinces, but there was not a popular consensus on which 
type of government or ruler the people wanted.139 A fatwa issued by Ayatollah al-Sharazi 
and subsequent Iraqi uprising in 1920 contradicted the acquiescence as initially reported 
by Wilson.  Eventually the British installed King Faisal as head of the nascent state.  
Despite being granted a monarch and sovereignty, British manipulation in Iraq was 
evident in a bogus referendum claiming 96% approval of King Fiasal by the 
population.140 
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 The Iraqi people, as well as some British officials, were not deceived by the 
Mandate and its disguise of indirect rule.  British imperial tendencies were transparent 
through various policy decisions.  Control of the military was primarily in the hands of 
the British and internal security was often executed by the colonial troops or their 
proxies, the Assyrians.141  Economic and political institutions including trade decisions, 
foreign policies, and tariffs were placed under the auspices the British administration 
while civil society duties were doled out to the locals.142  A blatant signal of British 
authority was codified in the 1922 Cairo Conference Treaty which cited the requirement 
for the Iraqi king to give deference to the British on all fiscal policies.143  This treaty also 
required Iraq to pay half of the costs of British occupation and the salaries of the officials 
“advising” the new government.144  British manipulation took a significantly more 
heavy-handed stance during latter Royal Air Force campaigns against the Iraqis.  Despite 
the Mandate system admonishments, the British were not letting the Iraqis “run their own 
show.” 
 Discontent of intrusive British policies in Iraq was also evident at home in 
England.  The more experienced Middle East advisors, including T.E. Lawrence and 
Gertrude Bell, warned that Arab nationalism was too embedded within the region to 
allow for traditional imperialist administration.145  This new school of thought, referred 
to as the “Anglo-Egyptian school,” supported a non-intrusive advisement of Arab state 
growth.146  Gertrude Bell opined that the British administrators should “Give them [the 
Arab governments] responsibility and make them settle their own affairs and they’ll do it 
every time and a thousand times better than we can.”147  This way of thinking was in 
direct contrast to the A. T. Wilson administration’s and Mandate’s direct interference in 
Iraqi affairs.           
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 Although the language of the League of Nation’s Mandates did not allude to overt 
colonialism, the evidence was visible and the mandate system could be perceived as a 
form of “neo-colonialism.”  In all fairness, Percy Cox, A.T. Wilson and the British 
colonial office were merely acting out the Western Orientalist sentiment of the day.  
European states assumed that they, not the Arabs, knew the best path of advancement for 
the Middle East.   The British were especially resolute in this opinion as expressed by a 
Gertrude Bell in an apparent contradiction to earlier Anglo-Egyptian school beliefs.  She 
qualified the Orientals and Iraqis as “like a very old child…he is not practical in our 
acceptance of the world, any more than a child is practical, and his utility is not ours.”148 
Despite the Wilsonian-based intentions of the League of Nations, the mandates resulted 
in truly being “colonialism in drag.”149  European powers had assumed the region needed 
their tutelage and more importantly, they saw the strategic gains to be had.  The 
ideological legitimacy and altruistic earnestness of the mandate could not disguise the 
colonial-minded motivations of the Western powers and of Britain in particular.   
B. REALISM TO “REALISTIC WILSONIANISM”: THE U.S. IN IRAQ150 
The American rationale for invading and remaining in Iraq had similar tones of 
ideological legitimacy and sincerity.  The United States initiated a pre-emptive war under 
two premises: 1) the realist goal of obtaining domestic security against international 
terrorism and 2) the pseudo-idealist notion of achieving regional and international 
stability through the establishment of democracy and freedom.    
Given the absence of another spectacular terrorist attack within the United States, 
it can be assumed that the Iraq War and the overall Global War on Terrorism were 
partially successful in meeting the first goal.  However, the U.S.’ second objective of 
establishing a stable liberal democracy in Iraq has obviously proven to be a much more 
difficult task.  This is because the principles behind seeking security are more universally 
comprehensible than the sometimes hazy ideology driving democratic liberalization.  
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 In a historic rarity, the United States found itself domestically vulnerable 
following the terrorist attacks of 9-11.  This vulnerability prompted a drastic reevaluation 
of American counterterrorism policies which had previously been more defense-
centric.151  Departing from the common adage that “the best offense is a good defense,” 
the Bush administration sought to instead seek out and eliminate the threat.  In a speech 
to West Point cadets shortly after 9-11, President Bush announced his pre-emptive 
strategy, “Our security will require all Americans to be forward-looking and resolute, to 
be ready for pre-emptive action when necessary to defend our liberty and to defend our 
lives.”152  This offense-minded approach would latter be articulated in the September 
2002 National Security Strategy. 
 American military action into Afghanistan was a strategic response to the 9/11 
attacks as it was commonly known that the region was home to terror training camps and 
a general feeding ground for violent-minded Islamic radicals.  Estimates state that since 
the 1980s, there had been 50,000 to 100,000 militants trained in Afghani terror camps.153  
According to British and Pakistani sources, the U.S. had already began planning for a 
mid-October military action against the Taliban administration in July 2001, two months 
prior to 9/11.154  The aggressive military campaign in Afghanistan was initially 
successful and the U.S. administration quickly turned to phase two of its Global War on 
Terrorism—the invasion of Iraq.155     
 The Iraq invasion spurred a myriad of controversies concerning its justifications.  
Much of the American population is probably still unclear as the real reasons behind the 
invasion.  As George Packer wrote his book “Assassins Gate” the Iraq invasion has 
“something to with September 11. But what exactly?”156  Proponents of the invasion 
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claimed that it was the next logical step in securing the U.S. against Al-Qaeda and other 
terrorist threats.  Opponents of the war claimed that it was simply an opportunistic 
attempt by the U.S. to increase hegemonic power over Middle East oil resources.  
Although the control for oil justification seems viable, it was not wholly applicable as the 
primary reason for the invasion.  Prior to the war, the U.S. already had significant access 
to huge oil deposits in the Gulf and in Saudi Arabia and its oil interests were not under 
any real threat.157  
Besides secure access to oil, another possible justification for the war was the 
prevention of Saddam Hussein from acquiring or using weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD).  The American people reeling from the 9/11 attacks were deeply suspicious of 
Saddam Hussein and favored military action against his regime.  An April 2002 Pew 
Research Center poll estimated that 69 percent of Americans supported a military 
campaign to overthrow Saddam.158  Moreover, the perception of Iraqi threat was bi-
partisan and a majority of both Democrat and Republican officials agreed that actions 
must be taken.  Senator Hillary Clinton stated her support for the Senate Joint Resolution 
45 which authorized use of armed forces against Iraq, “I have concluded, after careful 
and serious consideration, that a vote for the resolution best serves the security of our 
nation.”159    
Despite United Nations weapons inspector Hans Blix’s assurances of Iraqi 
cooperation and eleventh hour efforts by the Iraqis to appeal against military actions, the 
U.S. administration doggedly supported the argument that only a pre-emptive war with 
Iraq would reconcile the danger of WMDs.  In an February 2003 interview, Iraqi Deputy 
Prime Minister, Tariq Aziz, stated that “America has long since decided to attack Iraq 
and nothing Iraq could do would prevent it.”160   American military leadership also saw 
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the proverbial writing on the wall.  U.S. Army Lt. General David McKeirnan stated that 
“I think from last fall [2002] we knew it was a question of just when, not if.”161  
 The preparation for an Iraq invasion had its dissent within the Bush 
administration. The Bush administration was divided into two camps, one side led by 
former Secretary of State Colin Powell, argued for a more diplomatic approach of 
containment.162  The pro-invasion and regime change camp, led by Donald Rumsfeld and 
Vice-President Cheney discounted the containment approach as ineffective.163  Shortly 
before the initial U.S. invasion, political scientists John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt 
wrote an article making a very strong argument for “vigilant containment” while stating 
that a preventative Iraq war would lack “compelling strategic rationale.”164  Rumsfeld 
and Cheney overruled the containment policy and claimed that the possibility of a 
“nuclear-armed Saddam” was too risky.165  This turning point from containment and 
deterrence to offensive measures gave rise to aggressive moralism found in the “Bush 
Doctrine” and its neo-conservative tenets.166         
 President Bush transitioned from his realist goals of self-protection to the neo-
conservative notion of the promotion of democracy by citing that the two ideas were 
interconnected: “I believe we have a responsibility to promote freedom that is as solemn 
as the responsibility is to protecting the American people, because the two go hand-in-
hand.”167  In a sense, neo-conservatism resembled ‘Wilsonianism with teeth’ or as 
Francis Fukuyama referred to it, “realistic Wilsonianism.”168  After sensing that the 
realist justification for the Iraq invasion was losing popular support both home and 
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abroad (exacerbated by the absence of WMDs in Iraq), the administration’s new rallying 
call was the spread of democracy to Iraq and the Middle East.   
 The administration’s new tactic of benevolent state-building was in contrast to 
President Bush Sr. and Clinton’s non-intervention policies in the Middle East. In fact, 
years earlier as Secretary of Defense for Bush Sr., Dick Cheney had strongly advocated 
against regime change in Iraq: 
Once you've got Baghdad, it's not clear what you do with it. It's not clear 
what kind of government you would put in place of the one that's currently 
there now. Is it going to be a Shia regime, a Sunni regime or a Kurdish 
regime? Or one that tilts toward the Baathists, or one that tilts toward the 
Islamic fundamentalists? How much credibility is that government going 
to have if it's set up by the United States military when it's there? How 
long does the United States military have to stay to protect the people that 
sign on for that government, and what happens to it once we leave?169  
A decade later, Mr. Cheney would be a key architect in the neo-conservative project of 
democratizing Iraq. The reversal in U.S. foreign policy strategy leads to the question of 
what caused this shift in ideology and policy. 
 A possible answer is found the new operating environment that the 9/11 attacks 
created.  Following the end of the Cold War, the U.S. was quickly and effectively 
asserting itself as a hegemon in a uni-polar international system.  The 9/11 terror attacks 
created a resistant entity against which the U.S. was finally forced to act.  The U.S. 
reaction consisted of the willingness to engage hostile forces. It also consisted of 
promoting the idea of American “exceptionalism” which is characterized as the 
adherence to the mission of expanding the American notions of freedom and 
democracy.170     
American exceptionalism resembles the British Mandate sentiment that the Iraqis, 
and the Middle East, needed and welcomed guidance from external actors in the 
development of their political and social institutions.  Like its British Mandate 
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predecessors, the U.S. occupation assumed that post-Saddam Iraq would need and want 
the tutelage of the American government in order to re-establish the state.  However, the 
democratic state-building mechanisms that the U.S. utilized in Iraq differ from the 
artificially emplaced government that the British introduced.  The U.S. also calculated 
that an American-style democracy would dovetail into its goal of regional stability and 
security.  In simpler terms, U.S. policy in Iraq evolved from realist notions of self-
protection to the ideology of expansion of democratic freedom in order to achieve 
international peace and stability.  Iraq would be a test case sample in the Middle East 
where the U.S. would discover if the notion of rebuilding states as liberal democracy 
would truly bring about stability and peace.    
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IV. “WORLD TIME” EFFECTS ON THE BRITISH AND 
AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IN IRAQ 
In addition to the ideological inconsistencies of the British and American 
invasions, the actual global environments in which they occurred are vastly different.  
This chapter focuses on the divergences between the British and American Iraq 
experiences in the context of “world time” progression and will analyze how these 
differences shaped subsequent state building processes. The chapter’s “world time” 
analysis of the two countries Iraq experiences will ultimately lead to the thesis conclusion 
in which the importance and implications of the contrasts between the British and 
American involvement in Iraq will be explained in the context of successful state 
building.       
Theda Skocpol wrote that “With state/societies as the units of analysis, limited 
generalizations about similar, recurrent national developments can be formulated.  But, 
even as this is done, attention should be paid to the effects of historical orderings and 
world historical changes.”171  These “historical orderings” and changes make up the 
concept of “world time,” or an intersection between state/societal development and 
international historical progression.   Skocpol’s reference to “world time” is relevant to 
the British/American scenarios in Iraq.  Although Skocpol’s application of world time 
deals primarily with social revolutions, the concept can apply to state formation as well.  
In the case of the Iraq, two major aspects of world time effecting the British and 
American Iraq experiences include: 1) historical eras and global trajectories and 2) 
existent state institutions.   
A. HISTORICAL ERAS AND GLOBAL TRAJECTORIES 
The global arena and historical eras in which the two invasions took place is 
vastly different in nature.  Unlike the American ascension to global dominance following 
the Cold War, the dominance of international power did fall to one country alone in the 
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aftermath of World War I.  Two of the major powerbrokers of the time, the British and 
the Russian, were involved in “The Great Game” where each country was determined to 
hold and exert power in Central Asian and other parts of the world.  At the same time, the 
British were contending with French power plays in the Middle East resulting in the 
secretive Sykes-Picot Agreement.  The British were unquestionably feeling threats to 
their role as a key international player and could no “longer assume that Britain’s 
influence would prevail outside Europe.”172  Prior to its Iraq invasion, the U.S. had the 
luxury of operating in an international environment where it was the sole global power.  
Unlike the Mandate era British, the U.S had no other international contenders.  At that 
point, China was still in the beginning stages of its meteoric economic resurgence and 
international organizations such as the United Nations and the European Union lacked the 
political and economic strength to counter the U.S. 
 During the pre-Mandate era, the British had actively pursued colonial ventures in 
all parts of the globe.  Asia, in particular India, was one of Britain’s more profitable 
undertakings.  The trade agreement between the two countries provided Great Britain 
with a favorable export balance and investment opportunities.173  The British also had 
established markets in its “white dominions” of Canada, Australia, New Zealand and 
South Africa.174  Throughout World War I, the British increasingly focused their 
attention on the Middle East and Iraq due to oil interests.  Although the post-World War I 
international relations scene eschewed outright colonialism, the power holders among the 
European states and Russia did not completely abandon imperial tendencies.  The British 
pursued global expansion out of two considerations: 1) “acquisition of enemy territories 
might serve as useful counters at a later stage,” and 2) “territories overseas were seen to 
be of intrinsic strategic importance, both in the sense of providing bases, troops and 
resources.”175 
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 Sensing the strategic importance in holding territories in the Middle East, other 
Western and European powers sought to exert influence in the region.  Following its 
World War I experience, the U.S. realized that they could no longer afford to be 
disinterested outsiders.  Moreover, the possibility of another global conflict underscored 
the importance of cultivating America as a key international player.  The European states 
were particularly attuned to the growing inevitability of another global conflict.  
Lingering international tensions resulted from unresolved World War I issues and 
Germany’s insistence on maintaining its status as a global power.  Adding to the Allies’ 
consternation was the fact that Germany was also rapidly increasing its military 
expenditures and war-making capabilities.   These fears about “an uncertain world order” 
were also coupled with declining domestic economies among the European states.176   
Like Britain, France took considerable interest in the Middle East for strategic and 
economic purposes.  Prior to World War I, the British and French had a de facto Middle 
East power sharing agreement, the Entente Cordiale, in which the British secured Egypt 
and France had the run of Morocco.177  Besides the economic benefits of maintaining 
Middle East interests, the Anglo-French agreement also served as a bulwark against 
growing German influence and power.178  French regional influence increased following 
the collapse of the Ottoman Empire.  In particular, the French were reaping financial 
gains from former Ottoman holdings in Syria.  Eventually the British and French Middle 
East policies coalesced into the Sykes-Picot Treaty which effectively gave the two 
countries primary control over the region. 
Despite a virtual Anglo-French monopoly of power in the Middle East, other state 
actors were actively pursuing interests within the region.  Italy had a significant troop 
presence in Libya which would grow exponentially as World War II loomed.  The 
Russian navy maintained a visible presence in the Persian Gulf. 179  The Russians also 
had considerable influence in northern Persia and had developed considerable economic 
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ties with the Persian government.180  Because of the close proximity of interests in 
Mesopotamia and Persia, the British and Russians carefully avoided conflict through 
acknowledgment of each other’s rights in the region.181  Nonetheless, there was “almost 
constant interference by the two rivals over the Persian economy” and continual 
jockeying for regional influence.182  Meanwhile, the Americans were concerned about 
access to the Suez Canal and regional oil production.  At the same time, the Germans 
were very interested in keeping up with their European counterparts in the international 
arena.  Although the Germans did not overtly display interest in the Middle East, they 
were very involved with Ottoman “financial affairs, infrastructure development, and 
military preparedness.”183  This close and potentially dangerous relationship worried the 
other European states.   
The confluence of international interests in the Middle East during the Mandate 
was a reflection of the post World War I global struggle for power.  The 1919 Paris Peace 
Conference and following San Remo and Cairo Conference illustrated how the current 
powers to be, such as the Britain, France, Italy, the U.S., Germany and Russia were 
locked in a tense competition for international economic and political legitimacy.  
Regardless of the various Middle East agreements and treaties aimed at divvying up the 
former Ottoman holdings and stabilizing the region, the resultant uncertainty affected the 
world climate as a whole.184 
Prior to the U.S. invasion of Iraq, the international arena had far fewer dominate 
political actors than during post-World War I era.  Unlike the mandate period British, the 
U.S. had no political or economic equals.  U.S. power was unrivaled and unprecedented 
as no state “in the modern era had ever enjoyed such a dominant global position.”185  
Russia had been crippled by its Cold War efforts and was struggling to rebuild.  Japan’s 
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once promising technological boom and enthusiastic entrance into the global economy 
had faltered.  China was in the beginning of its surprising economic surge.  Although the 
European Union (EU) was a decade old, its economic and political clout was still 
developing.  The EU’s GDP ranked third compared to the U.S. and NAFTA in 2003 and 
had not reached its current status of viable global competitor.186 American global 
dominance had evolved from its Cold War position of “superpower” to a more prevailing 
assignment as an international “hyperpower.”187 
America’s international position was the primary catalyst for its unilateral action 
in the Global War on Terrorism and Iraq invasion.  Prior to the invasion, U.S. dominance 
had been for the most part accepted by the international community due to the U.S. 
history of restraint and commitments to international institutions such as NATO and the 
World Trade Organization.188  The domestic vulnerability caused by 9/11 attacks spurred 
the U.S. to largely abandon the international institutions that had once restrained 
unlimited U.S. actions.  This domestic insecurity encouraged the U.S.to increase its 
hegemony and expand its security umbrella with or without help or approval.  The U.S. 
reasoned that “friends were politically necessary but military problematic” and as such 
decided to “fight the war in Afghanistan on its own terms” with or without a coalition.189  
Further unilateral actions continued as the U.S. shaped plans to invade Iraq.  Despite 
disapproval by key members of the United Nations Security Council, the U.S. pushed 
forward with plans to attack and overthrow Saddam.  U.S. action despite a recognized 
international consensus further highlights the unilateral manner of the America’s initial 
occupation of Iraq—a distinct departure from the British Mandate occupation and its 
supervision by the League of Nations 
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B. A FRACTURED MESOPOTAMIA VERSUS A MONOLITHIC IRAQ 
Following their World War victory, the British and French formed partnerships 
and executed treaties in order to counter German and Russian aspirations in the Middle 
East.  The 1920 San Remo Conference produced one of the most definitive and 
troublesome Middle East power sharing agreements.  Britain and France consented to a 
partial declaration of independence for Mesopotamia and Palestine.  The former Ottoman 
territories fell under the tutelage or mandate of the European states.  The arbitrary nature 
of the mandate’s territorial divide created wildly mixed and contentious populations 
while virtually ensuring continued regional confusion and political uncertainty.  Regional 
borders were drawn up without regard to historic or cultural considerations.  Singular 
ethnicities soon found themselves divided by artificial state borders.  The Kurds were 
victims of this phenomenon as their former tribal lands were annexed by Turkey, Iran, 
Syria and Iraq.  On the other hand, the drafting of new borders forced formerly distinct 
populations to fall under one state identity – an example being the Assyrians, Turkmen 
and Kurds in northern Iraq.  These artificial boundaries and amalgamation of separate 
populations intensified turmoil within the new states in and the region as a whole.190    
 Besides the arbitrary nature of state creation, the absence of efficient political 
systems plagued the former Ottoman territories.  The artificially created states lacked 
identity and solid frameworks for creating capable institutions.  Although the Ottomans 
maintained de facto administration over its provinces, the breadth of the empire 
precluded any firmly established political system at the state level.  Instead, the empire’s 
tradition of “non-intervention” was shored up by local leadership and decentralized 
rule.191  Any real rule exerted by the Ottoman Empire in Mesopotamia existed only on 
the provincial level under the supervision of mamluks.192   In addition to the sheer size of 
the empire, the Ottoman’s laissez faire style of administration stemmed from its attitude 
that its provinces and their populations existed only for the enrichment of empire.  The 
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result of the hands off approach to administration ultimately meant that the British 
Mandate Mesopotamia was a fractured state with no real central government or innate 
ability for self rule.   
 The amalgamation of Mesopotamia’s disparate populations and the lack of solid 
political institutions created an unstable environment that was entirely unsuited for state 
building.  Although the mandate establishment of Iraq created a supposed “central state 
apparatus,” any exercise of central authority was limited at best.193  This was because 
authority had been formerly vested at local level where there was no continuity in rule or 
political leadership.  Political authority that had been held by sheiks or urban 
administrators was constantly changing but it stayed intact despite the establishment of a 
central state.194   Additionally, community order was also maintained by religious clerics 
who were not always recognized by the state apparatus.    
 After being given the mandate by the League of Nations, the British quickly 
realized the difficulty of applying a central power to the fractured state.  They were 
unsure about the political future of Iraq and what manner of rule or administration they 
would exercise.  Mesopotamia’s history of aloof provincial administration and local tribal 
rule did not allow for a quick implementation of self governance.   Sir Earnest Dowson, a 
land tenure expert dispatched to Baghdad by the British observed that “It is evident that 
for several preceding centuries the officers of the Central Government were not in a 
position to exercise any systematic control over the large areas of the country…while the 
effective local and social units were tribes or sections of tribes.”195  The newly dubbed 
“Iraqis” were dubious about what sort of government should lead the new state or who 
should rule it.  After a hastily administered plebiscite “confirmed” Iraqi approval of 
British administration and King Faisal was inserted as monarch, the reach and capacity of 
a central government was still very much in question.  This was because of a lack of 
perceived legitimacy by the Iraqi as they did not know their new government.  In fact, the 
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former Mesopotamians were unsure who exactly they as the new “Iraqis” were or what 
their state represented.  Following his coronation as Iraq's first monarch, King Faisal 
lamented that: 
In Iraq there is still—and I say this with a heart full of sorrow—no Iraqi 
people but unimaginable masses of human beings, devoid of any patriotic 
ideal, imbued with religious traditions and absurdities, connected by no 
common ties, giving ear to evil, prone to anarchy, and perpetually ready to 
rise against any government whatsoever.196 
The absence of a stable political community following the Iraq’s inception proved 
to be continuing problem for the fledgling state throughout the course of the Mandate and 
following the British withdrawal from the country.  Despite his lack of native Iraqi 
credentials, King Faisal was able to maintain a semblance of order in the state and 
eventually earn approval from the population.  Unfortunately, King Faisal’s son and 
successor, Ghazi, was unable to continue his father’s tradition of leadership.  King 
Ghazi’s ineptness resulted in the political demise of the monarchy.197  The years 
subsequent King Ghazi’s rule were fraught with continual power struggles between 
political elites made up of former Ottoman-trained officers.  These elites often ruled for 
mere months before being supplanted by one of their peers.198  Eventually wide scale 
public disaffection for the politicians gave way to equally destabilizing bouts of military 
coups.199  In the end, Iraq’s central government was unable to maintain long periods of 
constructive rule or legitimacy. 
In contrast to Mandate era fractious state, the Iraq that the U.S. invaded was an 
authoritarian, one-party state under the heavy handed administration of Saddam Hussein 
and the Ba’ath party.  The Hussein regime traced its roots back to the 1968 Ba’ath 
overthrow of the Abdul Rahman Arif government.  Hussein captured and monopolized 
power with help from his Tikriti kinsmen.  The Tikritis were able to successfully project 
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political influence through Ba’ath party movement and strategies.200   Eventually, the 
Tikritis occupied almost every key position in government which subsequently allowed 
Hussein to emerge as “the real force behind the regime.”201   
Hussein arrived onto the political scene from a humble and violently criminal 
background.  His ascendency to power was marked with the brutal elimination of rivals 
and rampant cronyism.  Unlike his predecessors, Hussein was extremely successful in 
maintaining his power and influence throughout the state in the long term.  He was aided 
by beneficial economic strategies, Iraq-Iran War nationalism, and perhaps most 
importantly, his force of character.  Hussein’s previous experiences as government 
dissenter and political prisoner shaped his leadership style and manner of rule.  He was 
distrustful of almost everybody, secretive and overbearingly cruel.  He used his political 
cut-throat tactics to pounce upon the presidency after he marginalized President al-Bakr.  
Upon assuming power, Hussein instituted powerful and lethal internal security (Amn) 
and intelligence (Mukhabarat) organizations.202  These secret enforcement agencies, in 
addition to the aid of his kinfolk and military clout, made the new dictator arguably the 
most powerful ruler in Iraq history. 
In the same abrupt manner, the Ba’ath party rose from being a once banned power 
to the sole power holding organization in Iraqi politics.  Like Hussein, the Ba’ath party 
managed to extend its ideals and policies into “all aspects of Iraqi society to include labor 
unions, student federations and women’s groups.”203  By the late 1970’s, the Ba’ath party 
had become so engrained in the state that it was impossible to discern between the party 
and the state identities.204  After seizing the monopoly of power, the Ba’athists 
maintained a grasp on the one-party state by successfully implementing various revenue 
producing policies.  The Ba’ath espoused a unique socialist platform that heavily favored 
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the public sector but made some allowance for private enterprises.205  This divergence 
from typical “Russian Socialism” was described by Ba’ath founder Michel Aflaq as 
“Arab Socialism” which intertwined economic nationalism with political nationalism.206  
The Ba’ath party’s decision to nationalize Iraqi oil production was crucial in setting up 
further beneficial economic policies.  Nationalization of the oil industry resulted in huge 
increases of revenues in the mid-1970s.  More importantly, the decision to nationalize 
resulted in unemployment reduction, free health care, and fully subsidized university 
education.207  The wide scale social benefits provided by the Ba’ath party translated into 
public acceptance and concreted the party’s and Hussein’s hold on power.    
Hussein and the Ba’athists maintained an iron hold over the country despite the 
numerous political and economic catastrophes that befell Iraq during the late 1990’s.  
With the exception of the Kurds, the Iran-Iraq War bolstered nationalism against the 
“Persian” threat.  Moreover, the vast military build-up in response to the Iranian threat 
also strengthened Hussein’s hold on power.  Even the debilitating military defeat and 
economic downfall courtesy of the first Gulf War did not weaken the central 
government’s legitimacy or power.  Unlike the British occupation of a fragmented 
Mesopotamia, the U.S. invaded a stable, albeit authoritarian state, which had one of the 
region’s most established administration and political power base. 
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V. CONCLUSION  
Iraq’s political and social dynamics and have changed substantially during the 
course of research and writing for this thesis.   Iraq is no longer in danger of becoming a 
failed state, but rather has improved its status to a “fragile state.”208  Although 
controversy exists about its actual causal factors, most Americans concede that the 2007 
“Surge” has been a success.  Incidences of sectarian violence have diminished, Al-Qaeda 
in Iraq has reportedly been decimated and American casualties have plummeted.  There 
are considerable signs of economic progress as Iraq and China closed on a $3 billion oil 
deal and the Royal Dutch Shell oil company has re-opened its Baghdad offices.209  
Continued high oil prices have also brought in significant amounts of revenue, although 
the Iraqi government has been accused of not properly utilizing its new found wealth.  
Signs of increased security are evident as coalition forces hand over towns, cities and 
even entire provinces to their Iraqi Army counterparts.  The U.S. administration has 
forecasted a withdrawal of eight thousand troops in early 2009.  Moreover, the U.S. and 
Iraqi governments are steadily working towards a troop withdrawal timeline or “time 
horizon.” 
 Despite these political and military achievements, Iraq is still far from a complete 
success story.  Coalition commander, General Patraeus, cautioned that although military 
success in Iraq was evident, significant political and economic progress was still to be 
had.  In his farewell letter to the troops, the general reinforced his concern for the future 
of Iraq, “Our tasks in Iraq are far from complete and hard work and tough fights lie 
ahead…”210  Iraq’s internal security and overarching national identity are still tenuous 
aspirations.  Meanwhile Iraq’s central government is working hard to increase its 
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legitimacy and expand its authority.  Despite its efforts, shortcomings in the Iraqi 
government powers and the lack of a unified Iraqi identity are evident.  In September 
2008, Pesh Merga and Iraqi security forces engaged in an uneasy standoff in the 
predominately Kurdish city of Khanaqin.  Moreover, the Kurdish question is one that still 
plagues the central government and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future.  The 
fledgling government is also struggling with its capacity to spend its oil revenue on 
reconstruction, employment, and health care projects. 
 In a recent Foreign Affairs article, Stephen Biddle and Kenneth M. Pollack write 
that even as stability in Iraq increases, the country risks becoming “an ordinary Arab 
state.”211  This designation is not desirable given the “poor political and economic 
record” of the states in that region.212  The lack of overall political and economic 
successes among Arab states is in part due to the colonial legacies and Western 
interference over the past two centuries.  Historical events including the Sykes-Picot 
Agreement, the San Remo Conference, and the Mandates have all played crucial roles in 
shaping the political and economic dynamics of the region.  As outlined in this thesis, the 
British Mandate in Iraq directly influenced state institutions for decades.  In the same 
manner, the U.S. will have an indelible mark on future Iraqi institutions.  This thesis has 
shown however, that the British and American experiences in Iraq were significantly 
different and thus their impacts will differ as well. 
 The principal argument of this thesis has been premised on several historical 
contrasts between the two experiences in Iraq.  These contrasting factors play key roles in 
Iraqi state formation and resulting political and social legacies.  The imperialist driven 
ideology behind the British Mandate differs sharply to the U.S. motivation of self 
security through stability and promotion of democracy.  The countries’ ideological 
motivations directly influenced the follow on legacy of rule in Iraq in both eras.  The 
Mandate left behind an artificially installed monarch who was still closely tied to British 
political and economic policies.  Although Iraq was technically a newly formed and 
independent state, ineffective governing institutions virtually guaranteed domestic 
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turmoil and non-democratic rule.  On the other hand, fortified by its democratic ideology, 
the U.S. presence Iraq, when it ends, should foster a more stable and representative 
government. 
 The “world time” difference between the British and American invasions also 
supports the argument that their follow-on experiences in Iraq are substantially dissimilar.   
The British’s uncertain status in a multi-polar world influenced its manipulation of power 
of the Middle East and in Iraq.  The British occupation in Iraq reflected the desire to 
maintain a role as a player along with its European, Russian and even American 
counterparts.  The international conventions of time, along with Wilsonian liberalism and 
self determination, reshaped the global environment and Western state building 
enterprises.  The British and the French were ever mindful of the competing interests in 
the region and did not build states that would become stable and enduring.  Rather, the 
former colonial powers built weak, dependent states virtually ensuring European 
influence and manipulation in the region.         
 In contrast to the British Mandate era’s multi-polar environment, the American 
invasion and subsequent involvement in Iraq occurred while the U.S. was arguably still 
the global hegemon.  The invasion took place in absence of complete United Nations 
consent.  Despite the contributions of the “coalition of the willing,” U.S. forces made up 
the bulk of military and political power during the occupation.  Unlike their British 
Mandate counterparts, the American architects of Iraq state building attempted to set up 
an Iraqi state which it could eventually extract itself from—both physically and 
financially.        
 Finally, the Iraq which the British encountered was a former Ottoman territory 
lacking a strong central government.  Additionally, the Ottoman administration had been 
relatively lax and allowed rule to be decentralized throughout a series of mamluks, tribal 
sheiks, and clerics.  This meant that the British had a dual task of creating a central 
government as well as recreating an “Iraqi” people.  On the other hand, the U.S. invaded 
an Iraq which had a strong government capable of exerting its power and authority over 
the entire state.  The Iraqi people, although still harboring sectarian and cultural discord, 
still held strong nationalist tendencies—as evidenced by the Iran-Iraq War.  Although the 
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U.S. chose not to utilize the established institutions (i.e., Ba’ath party, Iraqi Army) in its 
attempt to rebuild the state, use of these firmly entrenched foundations could have 
considerably reshaped the Iraqi rebuilding and reconstruction effort. 
The purpose of this thesis has not been to excuse the shortcomings in the U.S. 
invasion and state-building endeavor.  Rather, the intent was to explain that a direct 
comparison between the British and American experiences in Iraq, while tempting, is not 
wholly accurate.  To paraphrase Mark Twain, history does not always repeat itself—but 
sometimes it rhymes.  The study of these contrasting factors and scrutiny of the “world 
time” concept would be useful for any future state-building missions that the U.S. may 
undertake.  An ideal solution would be to look at the British Mandate and U.S. lessons 
learned and compound them with global trajectories and existent institutional 
considerations.  As for Iraqi state-building, the motivating ideology and the global 
environment surrounding the U.S. involvement in Iraq may likely lead better institutional 
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